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RECENT DECISIONS
Search and Seizure-THE INVENTORY SEARCH

OF AN AuToMoBILE-Cabbler

v. Commonwealth) 212 Va. 520 (1971).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
right of an individual to be free in his person and effects from unreasonable
search and seizure.' The drafters of the provision had fresh memories of
the disregard for their individual liberties and sought to place definite restrictions on the activity of government officials.2 Their fear of the general
warrant prompted them to further provide that any warrant be issued only
upon probable cause determined by a magistrate and limited in scope.3 The
interpretation of the mandate of the amendment has been that all searches
conducted without a warrant issued in strict compliance with its provision
are unreasonable per se. 4 However, this general prohibition is tempered by
well defined exceptions, which, because of "exigent circumstances," bring
them within the general provisions of the Constitution.,
In defining the circumstances that permit warrantless intrusions, the courts
have undertaken to balance the conflicting demands of the individual for
privacy, and of society for protection from criminal activity.6 Perhaps re1 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
2 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US. 56 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting):
It makes all the difference in the world whether one recognizes the central fact
about the Fourth Amendment, namely, that it was a safeguard against recurrence
of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the
Revolution .... Id. at 69.
For additional material placing the fourth amendment in historical perspective, see
Note, WarrantlessSearches in Light of Chimel: A Return to the Original Understanding, 11 Amz. L. Rav. 457, 460-75 (1969).
.3 See note 1 supra.
4 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 US. 347 (1967):
Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth]
Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes," . . . and that searches conaucted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Id. at 357.
See also Morris v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 331, 157 S.E.2d 191 (1967).
t Seet, e.g., the catalogue of exceptions and the cases cited in Wheeler v. Goodman,
330 F. Supp. 1356, 1361-62 (W.D.N.C. 1971). And see notes 17-24 infra.
:E.g, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1961).
[ 1511
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membering the foundering fathers' abhorrence for warrantless intrusions,
the courts have been reluctant to expand the limited exceptions and have
in fact reaffirmed their belief in strict compliance with the terms of the
amendment.8 This reasoning places the burden on the intruding representative of society to establish that his particular acts were justified under the
circumstances. 9
In Cabbler v. Commnonwealth,' ° the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
a police inventory and removal of the contents of an automobile taken into
custody for safekeeping, and not for reasons incident to the arrest of the
accused,"' is a permissible police function and not a violation of the accused's
fourth amendment rights. Based on these findings the court ruled that the
fruits of the inventory were admissible as evidence in a subsequent trial for
an offense unrelated' 2 to the arrest of the accused.
On September 2, 1969, Cabbler was arrested in Community Hospital in
Roanoke, Virginia, and charged with shooting into an occupied dwelling,
a felony. After his arrest, the arresting officer advised Cabbler that his automobile, parked outside the hospital, would be removed to the city garage
for safekeeping until his release from custody. "The car, before being stored
in the City Garage, was taken to the police property room where the contents of the car were to be removed, inventoried and stored for safekeeping.
It was then that the police discovered the stolen goods that resulted in Cabbler's later convictions." 13 The inventorying officer found articles of clothing, which had been stolen from local stores, in the locked trunk of Cabbler's car.
The Virginia Court found that it had been the long standing policy of
the Roanoke police to take custody of an accused's property, including automobiles, when an arrest is made away from the accused's home. Since 1965,
7 E.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
8 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
o United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951):
In so doing the [Fourth] Amendment does not place an unduly oppresive
weight on law enforcement officers ....

Id. at 51.

See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948); Morris v. Commonwealth,
208 Va. 331, 157 S.E.2d 191 (1967).
10 212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1971).
11 Brief for Appellee, Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184 SYE.2d 781 (1971):
As pointed out above, in the statement of facts, the taking into custody of the
defendant's vehicle was in no way connected with his arrest for a shooting
incident .... Id. at 5.
12 Cabbler was arrested for shooting into an occupied dwelling and was subsequently
convicted of larceny based on the evidence discovered in the'locked trunk of his car.
The police were not looking for the stolen goods but came across them inadvertently In
the course of the inventory. 212 Va. at 521, 184 S.E.2d at 782.
13Id.
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after claims for reimbursement were filed by the owners of such safeguarded
automobiles, the police began removing, inventorying, and separately storing the contents of all such automobiles. In holding that the practice was
permissible, the court based its decision on the "public policy of the Commonwealth" to protect a citizen's rights in his property, and the reasonableness of the practice within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 14
Since the trial of the Cabbler case, the United States Supreme Court in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire'5 has reexamined pertinent aspects of the fourth
amendment, and the Cabbler holding should be analyzed in light of the
Coolidge guidelines. 16
The warrantless inventory procedure endorsed in Cabbler cannot be explained by any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement mentioned in
Coolidge or the additional exceptions that have become recognized by the
courts. Cabbler had not given his consent 17 to the inventory. It was not
conducted incident to his arrest 18 nor based on probable cause that the automobile contained evidence. 19 The automobile was not inventoried as a re14 Id. at 523, 184 S.E.2d at 783.
15 403 U.S.443 (1971).
16
1n Coolidge, after disallowing a warrant to search and seize the accused's auto-

mobile which had been towed by the police from his driveway following his arrest,
the Court examined the subsequent search and seizure in light of the rules governing
warrantless intrusions. The Court found that despite the existence of probable cause
to search, the actions by the police did not fit any of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement suggested by the State. Search incident to arrest was rejected because it
was not contemporaneous with the arrest of the accused and was not conducted in the
immediate vicinity of the arrest. Second, the Court rejected the applicability of the
general automobile exception described in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925),
because the opportunity to search was not fleeting. Finally, the Court rejected the
seizure of evidence under the plain view doctrine since the seizure of the automobile
was not inadvertent.
17 The report of the case reveals that Cabbler made no protest or complaint after
being advised that the car would be removed to the city garage. However, he was
not informed that the contents would be removed and inventoried. 212 Va. at 521, 184
SE.2d at 782. The consent exception to the warrant requirement has been recognized in
Henry v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 48, 175 S.E.2d 416 (1970).
I8 E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), where the Court limited the search
incident to arrest to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee. See note 11
supra. And see Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 176 S.E.2d 802 (1970).
19 E.g., Kirby v. Cox, 435 F.2d 684 (4th Cir. 1970). The police were not seeking
evidence, therefore Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), does not apply. In
Carroll,the search of an automobile was allowed because the mobility of the car on the
open road made the opportunity to search fleeting and the searching officer had sufficient probable cause to believe that car contained contraband. Neither of these tvo
conditions were present in Cabbler.
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suit of the "hot pursuit" of a criminal; 20 nor was it abandoned property,21
or seized as evidence pending forfeiture proceedings.2 No emergency situation threatened destruction of evidence 23 or injury to persons.24 How-

ever, Coolidge suggests another possibility that might encompass the Cabbler situation; the warrantless seizure of the stolen goods taken from the
locked trunk of Cabbler's car may have been pursuant to the "plain view"
doctrine.2 5
The plain view doctrine, while not one of the exceptions to warrant
searches mentioned above, is a warrantless intrusion into the privacy of an
individual. 26 The doctrine permits an official to seize articles which he recog-

nizes as evidence within his plain view if the original transgression of the
fourth amendment barrier of privacy was for a recognized legitimate purpose. It is not a warrantless search, but rather it is a justification for the
seizure of articles once either a proper search is underway or the officer's
20

E.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See also Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57 (1924).
21 If the property is abandoned, the fourth amendment does not protect it from intrusion since the accused has no interest of privacy to be protected. E.g., Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
22 Gabbler's car was not seized as evidence of a crime, therefore the exception described in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), does not apply. In Cooper, a
warrantless search of an automobile was justified because it was "closely related to the
reason petitioner was arrested, the reason his car had been impounded, and the reason
it was being retained." Id. at 61. See Carter v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 317, 163 S.E.2d
589 (1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 991 (1969). In Cabbler, the car came into police
custody because there was no one available to drive it away. And see Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), where, for the convenience of the owner, the arresting
officer took the car to the station rather than leaving it on the street. The Court disallowed the subsequent search of the car. In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391
U.S. 216 (1968), the Court reaffirmed the distinction between cars impounded as evidence and those removed for the convenience of the owner and disallowed the search
because the police were not required to keep the car and had no probable cause to
believe it contained evidence. Cabbler seems more closely analogous to Preston and
Dyke, than to Cooper. See generally One 1963 Chevrolet Pickup Truck v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 506, 158 SZE.2d 755 (1968), cert. denied 391 U.S. 964 (1968).
23E.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
24
E.g., Vauss v. United States, 370 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Barone,
330 F.2d 543 (2nd Cir. 1964), cert. denied 377 U.S. 1004 (1964).
25 E.g., Carter v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 317, 163 S.E.2d 589 (1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 991 (1969). For an analysis of the plain view doctrine as expressed in
Coolidge, see Kuipers, Suspicious Objects, Probable Cause, and the Law of Search and
Seizure, 21 DRAKE L. Rv. 252, 263-67 (1972).
26 For one Court's interpretation of the nature of the intrusion, see Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-68 (1971).
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presence is justified by "exigent circumstances." 27 Therefore, an essential
element of the plain view doctrine is the "prior justification" for the original
28
intrusion.
In addition to the necessary "prior justification," the seizure under plain
view must be inadvertent. The rationale of this requirement is to avoid what
the court in Coolidge termed "plannedwarrantless seizure [s] .29 " A planned
warrantless seizure would not be a plain view seizure but rather an illegal
search, because the fabricated nature of the seizure would vitiate 0 the circumstances under which the official could act without a warrant.8 ' Therefore, if the official's presence is legitimate under the "prior justification" test,
and the seizure not anticipated under the inadvertence test, the fourth amendment has not been violated. A requirement that the official ignore evidence
under these circumstances would place an unreasonable restriction on effective police practice without a commensurate preservation of individual
freedom. The underlying philosophy of the rule is that the real violation
of privacy is the presence of the official within the individual's zone of privacy. Since his presence has been justified, the additional intrusion of seizing objects, which he recognizes as evidence that comes into plain view, -is
32
incidental.
Considering the second requirement first, the seizure in Cabbler was unwhere the evidence fell into
the
door
of
a
car impounded as evidence.
officer
opened
view
when
the
police
plain
And see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 43 (1963); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559,
563 (1927).
28
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971):
27 E.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968)

The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification-whether it be a warrant
for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused-and permits the warrantless seizure. Id. at 466.
29 Id. at 471 n.27.
30 But to extend the scope of such an intrusion to the seizure of objects-not contraband nor stolen nor dangerous in themselves-which the police kmow in advance they
will find in plain view and intend to seize, would fly in the face of the basic rule that
no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless seizure (footnote omitted). Id.

at 471. In developing this point the Court seems to resurrect the distinction between
"mere evidence" and contraband which had been put to rest in Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967). Mr. Justice White criticized the Court for drawing this distinction.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 519 (1971) (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
31 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971):
But where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the
location of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether different.
The requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no inconvenience whatever . . .
in the absence of "exigent circumstances." Id. at 470.
82
"As against the minor peril to Fourth Amendment protections, there is a major
gain in effective law enforcement." Id. at 467.
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anticipated. There was no evidence in the case to indicate that the Roanoke
police suspected that the car contained stolen goods, or that the inventory
was used as a guise in order to search the car. This was not a "planned
warrantless seizure." 3s
Therefore, to explain the warrantless seizure it must be shown that there
was no intrusion recognizable in fourth amendment terms; i.e., Cabbler had
no right of privacy in the situation, or, in the alternative, that the intrusion
was justified under the circumstances.
It has been consistently held that the fourth amendment protects the accused's right of privacy in his automobile.3 4 The cases from Carrollv. United
States3 5 to Coolidge have recognized that the seizure of articles found in an
automobile must be in compliance with the fourth amendment. Cabbler had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the automobile which was not altered
when it was taken into protective custody.3 6 Consequently, since the inventory was allowed, the intrusion must have been justified under the circumstances; i.e., the two underlying reasons given for the inventory procedure,
the protection of Cabbler's property and the protection of the police from
possible liability, must supply the requisite "prior justification" to allow the
plain view doctrine to authorize the seizure.
The "prior justifications" which have provided warrantless foundations
for the operation of the plain view doctrine have been limited to either the
well recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement31 or "where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object." 18
33 See note 29 supra.

34Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971): "The word 'automobile' is
not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears."
Id. at 461-62. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364
U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
35 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
36 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), where the Court held that an individual

had a reasonable expectation of privacy while making a call from a public telephone
booth. "For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Id. at 351. And see
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967).

See notes 5 and 17-24 supra.
38 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). To support this category
of "exigent circumstances" the Court cites four cases: Frazier v. Cupp, 394 US. 731
(1969), where the incriminating evidence was found in a duffle bag which the accused
shared with a friend, after the friend had given the police permission to search;
37

Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), where the evidence was discovered

while the police were taking measures to protect the car while it was in police custody
after being impounded as evidence; Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), where
the accused sold incriminating evidence to an undercover agent; and, Ker v. California

374 U.S. 23 (1963), where the police seized evidence as a result of being in the accused's home based on probable cause to arrest.
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The first group of "exigent circumstances," with the exception of consent searches and searches of abandoned property, involve grave circumstances compelling immediate action to preserve evidence, capture a fleeing
suspect, or protect the safety of persons.39 It might be argued that the "prior
justification" in the Cabbler case, the protection of property, fits the general tenor of this group of exceptions. 40 However, the situation presented
in Cabbler does not contain the urgency that is characteristic of this group.
The urgency to search or seize is the essential element which provides the
authority for this type of warrantless intrusion.41 To hold otherwise would
grant the authority to search, without fourth amendment restrictions, any
automobile in custody, for whatever reason, based on the otherwise legitimate obligations to protect private property. Such reasoning has not been
endorsed by the United States Supreme Court.42
While lacking the requisite urgency to fit the first category of "exigent
circumstances," the facts in Cabbler may supply a sufficient "prior justification" under the general provisions of the second category.4 The reasoning of a majority of courts which have considered the issue supports this
contention. 44 The basis for their reasoning is that once the automobile comes
into police custody, the police have a duty45 to protect its contents. Given
39

See notes 17-24 supra.
40 For an argument that Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), may be authority
for including the inventory conducted in Cabbler in the exceptions, see 29 WASH. &
LEE L. Rxv. 197, 203-07 (1972). In Cooper v. California, supra at 61-62 (1967), the
Court stated: "It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain the
car in their custody for such a length of time, had no right, even for their own protection, to search it." But see note 22 supra, for a possible distinction between Cooper
and Cabbler.
41United States v. Broomfield, 336 F. Supp. 179 (ED. Mich. 1972):
The cases cited by Justice Stewart [in Coolidge] as constituting "exceptions"
which justify the initial intrusion . ..can be characterized by the term, and the
presence of, "exigent circumstances:' That is to say, that "plain view alone"
(emphasis added) is not a sufficient basis to justify a warrantless search, there must
also be, contemporaneously, an urgency or immediacy that is pervading and compelling. Id.at 183.
42 Cooper v. California 386 U.S. 58 (1967):
While it is true, as the lower court said, that "lawful custody of an automobile
does not of itself dispense with constitutional requirements of searches thereafter
made of it," . . . the reason for and nature of the custody may constitutionally
justify the search. Id. at 61.
43 See note 38 and text supra.
44 See W"r.RiNGEL, SEARCHES AN SEiZURES, AR S AND CONFESSIONs 372 (1972):
That items of evidence found in searches of vehicles, lawfully in police custody,
when such searches are not made for the purpose of seeking evidence of crime,
may not be suppressed is becoming the increasingly accepted view.
See also 29 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 197, 204 n.66 (1972).
45 United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1972), where the court held that
evidence discovered during an inventory of articles in plain view inside an impounded
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this duty, the inventory procedure is a reasonable means of fulfilling the
duty4 6 and protecting the police from possible liability for lost articles. Applying the conclusions of these cases to the plain view doctrine, the presence
of the officer within the accused's fourth amendment zone of privacy is for
a legitimate purpose, because the transgression is not to seize evidence but
to protect the property of the accused. Therefore, the reasoning goes, since
his presence is legitimate, based on the duty to protect the property, the
seizure of objects recognized as evidence within plain view does not violate
the fourth amendment. This theory supports the opening of the trunk to
Cabbler's car and the seizure of the clothing found therein.
While representing the majority view, such reasoning has been subject
48
to some critical comment4r and has been rejected by a minority of courts.
As an example of the minority view, the Supreme Court of California in
Mozzetti v. Superior Court49 reasoned:

In weighing the necessity of the inventory search as protection of the
owner's property against the owner's rights under the Fourth Amendment, we observe that items of value left in an automobile to be stored
by the police may be adequately protected merely by rolling up the
locking the vehicle doors and returning the keys to the
windows,
60
owner.
car was admissable. The court cited the lack of intent to discover evidence, the need
to protect the property of the accused and the desirability of protecting the police
from claims for lost property. United States v. Boyd, 436 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1971),
where the car had been demolished and could not be secured if left on the street.
There the court said: "Once the car was taken to headquarters the 'officers were under
a duty to itemize the property [therein] and store it for safekeeping.'" Id. at 1205.
Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967), where the accused was arrested
for prowling and his car was impounded to protect it. The court stated: "The police
have as much a duty to protect the property of a suspect as they have to protect the
property of the rest of us . .. ."' Id. at 392.
46People v. Robinson, 36 App. Div. 2d 375, 320 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1971). The accused's
automobile was impounded after a lawful arrest and the incriminating evidence, a
pistol, was found in the trunk during a routine inventory search. The court stated:
The "search" of a vehicle which has been lawfully impounded for the purpose
of inventorying its contents is calculated to safeguard them for the benefit of
their rightful owner as well as to protect the police against possible dishonest
claims of misappropriation of the vehicle's contents . . . [is] in furtherance of a
wholly reasonable and legitimate purpose [and therefore is valid]. 320 N.Y.S.2d
at 668.
47See Stroud, The Inventory Search and the Fourth Amendnzent, 4 IND. LEG. F. 471
(1970); Comment, Cbimel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle Searches,
17 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 626, 639-42 (1969-70); 29 WAsH. & LEE L. Rav. 197 (1972).
48Mayfield v. United States, 276 A.2d 123 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971); Mozzetti v. Superior
Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
49 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971).
50 ld. at 707, 484 P.2d at 89, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
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As for the protection of the police from claims of loss, the court examined the law of California and determined that the police were involuntary bailees and as such they were not liable for ordinary negligence in safeguarding the contents of the automobile, and that "it cannot be urged seriously that they [the police] fail to adequately fulfill their duty by rolling
up the windows and locking the doors of vehicles taken into custody." 51
In holding that there is no difference in result between an "inventory"
and a "search" of an automobile, the California Supreme Court emphasized
the nature of the inventory as a random search, looking for nothing in
particular and everything in general, and characterized the random search
as the "precise invasion of privacy which the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit." 52 Such reasoning seems the better view, especially
when the inventory is viewed from the point of individual liberties. By
labeling the intrusion an inventory, the police no longer need comply
with the warrant and probable cause provisions of the fourth amendment. 3
The police, without probable cause, or for that matter even a hint that the
automobile may contain seizable evidence, may now conduct a random intrusion under circumstances that a magistrate would never permit.5 4 In fact,
under the guidelines of Coolidge,the police may be penalized if they do have
a suspicion that evidence does exist.5 5 Considering the intent and purpose
of the fourth amendment, it would be a true paradox to allow a random
intrusion in those cases where probable cause does not exist and to disallow
the intrusion where the police have a mere suspicion that evidence exists
but do not have probable cause. 6 Such reasoning places fourth amendment
guarantees in a semantical strait jacket, an approach that has been rejected
7
by the United States Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court
51 ld. at 708, 484 P.2d at 90, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
52d.
at 711, 484 P.2d at 92, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
53 The inventory procedure is usually conducted without a warrant and is justified
largely because the police are not looking for evidence. People v. Robinson, 36 App.
Div. 2d 375, 320 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1971); Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184
S.E.2d 781 (1971).
54
1n Cabbler, if the police had, instead of inventorying the contents of the car,
sought a warrant to search it, their lack of probable cause to believe it contained evidence would probably have prohibited one from being issued by a magistrate.
55 The police may run afoul of the Coolidge "inadvertent" test. See note 30 and
accompanying text supra.
56 The routine police inventory of the contents of an automobile is clearly distinguishable from the "stop and frisk" situation where the police are allowed to make a pat
down search based on less than probable cause. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
57 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). In Camara the Court applied the fourth amendment
to administrative inspections conducted under municipal health and safety laws. The
Court felt that fourth amendment principles should govern the intrusion despite the
fact that it was not a search for evidence in the traditional sense. The Court balanced
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In Camara, the Court, faced with a balancing of interest problem similar
to that faced by the Virginia Court in Cabbler, found that probable cause
was the very basis of reasonableness, and that the warrant procedure is the
proper mechanism with which to balance the needs of society and the privacy of the individual. 58 The Court held that the interest of the public to
be free from disease and unsafe conditions could provide the necessary probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to inspect a dwelling only because
"it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique [than an inspection]
would achieve acceptable results." 59
With this view in mind, it can be argued that the Virginia Court misapplied the reasonableness standard 6o in Cabbler in light of Mozzetti's findings that there are other less offensive means of protecting the accused's
property.61
Thus in Cabbler, since it can be argued that the property of the accused
could have been protected by means other than an inventory, the "prior
justification" for the procedure vanishes, thus invalidating the seizure of
the goods under the plain view doctrine.
The conclusion must be that if the inventory does not fit one of the
established exceptions to the warrant requirement, and fails to qualify under
the plain view doctrine, the only remaining explanation for the Virginia
the social need to be free from health and safety hazards against the individual's right
to privacy and concluded that when the inspecting officials had probable cause to believe a building contains a hazard, a suitably restricted warrant could be issued. And
see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 n.15 (1968), where the Court disregarded semantical differences between a search and the "stop and frisk" situation and held that the
fourth amendment governed the intrusion.
58Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967):
[Rleasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies
the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Id. at 539.
59 d. at 537 (emphasis added).
60
In addition, the "reasonableness test" itself is in doubt in the wake of Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). There the Court embraced the approach proposed by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 83 (1950), and rejected reasonableness as "founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on
considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests.' Chimel v. California, supra
at 764-65. By so holding, the Court has breathed new life into the probable cause and
warrant requirements of the fourth amendment and cast doubt on the propriety of
creating yet another exception to those requirements. For a thorough treatment of
Cbinel's possible effect on automobile searches, see Comment, Chinel v.California: A
PotentialRoadblock to Vehicle Searches, 17 U.CJL.A. L. Rav. 626 (1969-70).
61 The Carnara holding strongly implies that if the public health and safety could be
adequately protected by a procedure that did not intrude into the privacy of the individual, then probable cause would vanish and the inspection would be unreasonable
whether under warrant or not. See note 59 supra.
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Court's acceptance of the procedure is that an additional exception has.been
created.6 2 The question is whether. such action is justified in light, of the
possibilities for abuse that exist when departures are made from the war63
rant procedure.
The argument is not that an unreasonable burden be placed on police conduct, but rather that consistent principles of fourth amendment law be
applied to all intrusions into the privacy of the individual despite the terminology that is employed to describe the intrusion." The objection to the
inventory procedure used in Cabbler is that a practice designed to protect
property and the police from liability may at the same time go too far and
allow diminution of one's right to be-free from random searchs. 5 F. P.

62 The Virginia Supreme Court did not indicate which approach it used to reach its
conclusion that the inventory was a reasonable and acceptable police procedure. Other
state courts have attempted to determine whether or not the procedure is a search, with
varying results. Compare Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 412 (1971) (a search, evidence not admissable) 'With People v. Robinson, 36 App.
Div. 2d 375, 320 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1971) (not a search, evidence admissable). The Virginia
Court avoided this problem by not addressing the point. In defense of the Virginia
approach, the answer to the search question should not be determinative of the constitutional issue involved. The answer to this central question must turn on the justification for and the nature of the warrantless intrusion. See notes 57 & 58 supra.
6 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), where the Court discussed the problems inherent when arrests are made without probable cause. Their warning against such
unrestricted police conduct is pertinent here:
But "good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough." ... If subjective good faith alone werethe test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment
would evaporate, and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects," only in the discretion of the police. Id. at-97. 64United States.v. Mitchell, 459 F. 2d 960, 964 (9th-Cir. 1972) (Ely, J., dissenting).;
People v. Robinson, 320 N.Y.S.2d 665, 671 (1971) (Gulotta & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
65A possible solution to the Cabbler situation would be to inform the car owner
that its contents will be inventoried if it is taken into protective custody. Armed with
the facts, the owner could .make. an informed choice between police custody or his
own measures to protect the car pending his release. Or, as an alternative, the police
inventory could be limited to artidles likely to be stolen, such as those in open view
within the car. In any event, the inventory should not be alloiVed to extend to
articles already secure in the locked trunk-.of the car.

